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Abstract 
Analysts of regional growth differences in the US tend to assume full spatial equilibrium 
(Glaeser et al, 1995). Flows of people thus indicate changes in the distribution of spatial 
welfare more effectively than differences in incomes. Research in Europe, however, shows 
that people tend to be immobile. Even mobility within countries is restricted compared to the 
US but national boundaries offer particular barriers to spatial adjustment. Thus it is less 
reasonable to assume full spatial equilibrium in a European context and differences in per 
capita incomes may persist and signal real spatial welfare differences. Furthermore, it implies 
that the drivers of what population movement there is, may differ from the drivers of spatial 
differences in productivity or output growth. This paper analyses the drivers of differential 
urban growth in the EU both in terms of population and output growth. The results show 
significant differences in the drivers as well as common ones. They also reveal the extent to 
which national borders still impede spatial adjustment in Europe. This has important 
implications for policy and may apply more generally to countries – for example China -  less 
homogeneous than the USA. 
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Urban Growth Drivers and Spatial 
Inequalities: Europe - a Case with 
Geographically Sticky People 
 
1. Introduction 
Much work has been done on regional growth processes in the U.S. (e.g., Rey and 
Montouri, 1999; Glaeser et al, 1995). However, this work has been based on an 
explicit or implicit underlying assumption of full spatial equilibrium. This is 
explicitly the case with Glaeser et al (1995). They argue that since, if there is full 
spatial equilibrium, people are unable to improve their welfare by moving from one 
place to another, flows of people indicate changes in the distribution of spatial 
welfare (as people move to places offering superior opportunities or lifestyles) more 
directly than do changes in income levels or rates of growth of income.  
In contrast, research in Europe shows that people tend to be quite immobile. Net 
migration between similarly sized geographic regions in the U.S. is 15 times greater 
than in Europe (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006). This is despite the fact that differences 
in real incomes and employment opportunities are substantially greater and 
geographic distances smaller in Europe than in the U.S. Even mobility within 
countries is limited compared to the U.S. But as we will illustrate here, national 
boundaries offer particular barriers to spatial adjustment. Thus it seems 
unreasonable to assume full inter-regional or inter-urban equilibrium in a European 
context; differences in per capita incomes are persistent and likely to signal real 
spatial welfare differences. Furthermore, the reluctance of people to move countries 
or apparently even move inter-regionally in Europe suggests that the drivers of 
whatever population movement there is in Europe may differ from the drivers of 
spatial differences in productivity or output growth. 
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This paper combines theory with empirical analysis to investigate the drivers of 
spatial growth processes, welfare, and disparities in a context in which people are 
markedly immobile. Drawing on two of our recent papers (Cheshire and Magrini, 
2006 and 2009), we review the evidence on the drivers of differential urban growth in 
the European Union (EU), both in terms of population and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita growth. We conclude that while environmental ‘goods’, in the form 
of climate differences, are significant influences on urban population growth, there is 
no general process of the European population ‘moving to the sun’. Climate 
differences are significant only as they vary from national values: not as they 
systematically vary from European values. Moreover, while there do appear to be 
some Europe-wide economic drivers of population movement, we find that their 
influence is less than in the case of economic growth differences. Analysis of spatial 
dependence and its determinants also reveals substantial national boundary barriers 
to both population and economic adjustment. Together, these findings suggest that 
one cannot reasonably maintain the assumption of full spatial equilibrium in a 
European context.  
In Section 2 we give some technical detail and explanation about our units of analysis 
– Functional Urban Regions (FURs). These are a ‘core-based’ type of urban region 
similar to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas which provide the units for 
much applied urban economics in the U.S. Readers may want to skip this section at a 
first reading although the use of data for FURs is central to our approach. In Section 
3 we summarize the results concerning the drivers of population growth, reported in 
detail in Cheshire and Magrini (2006), and then summarize the results of a more 
recent analysis of the drivers of growth in FUR GDP per capita (Cheshire and 
Magrini, 2009).We find strong indications of population immobility and sluggish 
migration response across national borders and also find that economic adjustment 
between neighboring city-regions is strongly impeded by national borders. In 
analyzing the drivers of economic growth, we pay particular attention to the role of 
highly skilled human capital, concentrations of R&D, and the potential role of 
differences in systems of local government in a (‘non-Tiebout’) world of sticky 
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people and territorial spillovers with local public goods. Although when analyzing 
the determinants of urban population and economic growth there are some drivers 
in common and these apparently reflect the immobility of Europeans, we also find 
important differences. The final section offers an interpretation of why there are such 
differences and what they suggest both for spatial adjustment, spatial equilibrium 
and policy. 
 
2. Meaningful Data for Useful Regions 
Our regions 
Our units of analysis are core-based urban regions – or Functional Urban Regions 
(FURs) – similar in concept to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) 
familiar from the U.S. literature. These FURs were originally defined in Hall and Hay 
(1980), but some of their boundaries were slightly updated and revised in Cheshire 
and Hay (1989). Since then, the data set relating to these FURs has been continuously 
updated, although their boundaries remain fixed as at 1971. The urban cores are 
identified on the basis of concentrations of jobs. Using the smallest spatial units in 
each country for which the basic data were available, all contiguous units with job 
densities exceeding 12.35 per hectare were combined to identify the FUR core-city. 
The FUR hinterland was then identified by combining all the contiguous units from 
which more people commuted to jobs in the given core than commuted elsewhere, 
with a minimum cut-off of 10 percent. This definitional method was used for the 
great majority of countries, but in some cases critical data were unavailable, so 
alternative methods had to be used. The most extreme case was Italy, where 
previously defined retail areas were substituted for the FUR boundaries. Because of 
the difficulties of estimating comparable data for the FURs, we analyze patterns of 
growth only for the largest 121 FURs. All of these FURs are in the former EU-121 – 
                                                        
1 That is, in the countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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excluding Berlin – and all had a total population of more than one third of a million 
and a core city of more than 200,000 at some date since 1951. 
 
Why FURs not NUTS? 
There are significant advantages of using functionally, as opposed to adminis-
tratively, defined regions as the units of analysis. Even across a country as consti-
tutionally unified and developmentally homogeneous as the U.S., states, counties 
and cities vary considerably in how they relate to patterns of behavior or economic 
conditions. In Europe the official regions (the NUTS2) are far more disparate since 
they combine within one system very different national systems. Even within one 
country – Germany – the largest NUTS Level 1 regions vary from hangovers from 
the Middle Ages – such as Bremen (population 0.7 million) or Hamburg (1.7 million) 
- to regions such as Bavaria, with a population of 12.3 million and the size of several 
smaller European countries combined. In terms of administrative competence, 
Germany has 16 of the functionally very disparate Länder (NUTS Level 1 regions), 
each with substantial powers and constituting the elements of its Federal system; 
below that are the Kreise (NUTS Level 3) – 439 of them in 2003. Britain has 12 NUTS 
1 regions, corresponding in mean size to the Länder, but only one of them – Scotland 
- has any real administrative or fiscal independence. In Britain, there are only 133 of 
the smaller units supposedly equivalent to the Kreise. Bavaria, despite including 
major cities such as Munich, had a population density of only 174 people per square 
km, compared to 4,539 in the NUTS Level 1 region of London or 2,279 in Hamburg 
(CEC, 2004). 
More significant than their heterogeneity in size and administrative powers is the 
fact that the official NUTS regions are economically heterogeneous. In some cases 
                                                        
2 Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (N.U.T.S.) regions. This is a nesting set of 
regions based on national territorial divisions. The largest are Level 1 regions; the smallest for 
which a reasonable range of data is available are Level 3. Historically Level 3 NUTS regions 
corresponded to Counties in the UK, Départements in France; Provincies in Italy or Kreise in 
Germany. 
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they contain very different local economies within the same statistical unit (for 
example, Glasgow and Edinburgh in Scotland or Lille and Valenciennes in Nord-Pas-
de-Calais) and in others a single city-region is divided among as many as three 
separate units. The functional reality of Hamburg, for example, is divided among 
three different Länder: Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Niedersachsen. There are 
thus many NUTS regions with large scale and systematic cross border commuting 
and some contain mainly bedroom communities near large cities. Others (for 
example, Brussels, London, Bremen or Hamburg) are effectively urban cores or only 
small parts of urban cores. This means that residential segregation influences the 
value of variables such as unemployment, health or skills if measured on the basis of 
the boundaries of NUTS. Moreover, measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Value Added or productivity per capita can be grotesquely distorted since output is 
measured at workplaces and people are counted where they live.  
Even measured growth in GDP per capita can be seriously distorted since over time 
residential (de)centralization may occur at different rates to job (de)centralization. 
The reported growth in GDP per capita for the NUTS region of Bremen during the 
1980s, for example, was 40 percent higher than for the Bremen functionally defined 
region. This was because of strong residential relative to job decentralization during 
that decade. These problems of statistical distortion are concentrated in the larger 
cities, because these tend to spill over their administrative boundaries; they are also 
concentrated in richer regions. This last facet of the distortions to official regional 
statistics results not only because richer regions tend to include larger cities but 
because a significant proportion of larger cities extend functionally beyond their 
administrative boundaries, so their recorded GDP (or GVA) per capita is overstated. 
 
Implications for Conventional Analyses of Spatial Disparities 
These are obvious points, causing us to have serious reservations about the many 
published analyses of regional growth rates in Europe that use official Eurostat data 
for NUTS regions. This means that official measures of so-called ‘regional disparities’ 
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– which show, for example, that in 2001 the ‘region’ of Inner London was 2.5 times as 
‘rich’ in per capita GDP as the mean for the EU-15 and 3.2 times as ‘rich’ as the UK’s 
poorest region -  are in essence completely invalid.  
It is for these reasons that we rely on our own data for FURs. There is one additional 
advantage of this choice in the present context. FURs are the most economically 
independent divisions of national territories that can be constructed. They represent 
concentrations of jobs and all those people who depend on those jobs – the economic 
spheres of influence of major cities. As a result, the benefits of additional 
employment or output are confined as much as possible to those who live within a 
given FUR.  
 
Our Approach to ‘Growth Regressions’ and Spatial Dependence 
Two idiosyncrasies of our approach should be noted. First, in our analysis of growth 
in GDP per capita we do not include the initial level of GDP per capita. So this 
analysis does not contribute to the regional growth regression literature stemming 
from the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; 
1992 or 1995). We find this literature to be both theoretically (see the discussion in 
Cheshire and Malecki, 2004) and empirically suspect. Empirically when we include 
the initial level of GDP per capita in our models, it clearly introduces 
multicollinearity and leads to very unstable parameter estimates for the variable – 
even signs flip. In essence, it is possible to generate either apparent β-convergence or 
β-divergence in equally respectable looking models. However, in all of our better 
specified models, the effect, if included, of initial GDP per capita on subsequent 
growth performance is statistically insignificant.  
The second idiosyncrasy of our approach is in our interpretation of any finding of 
spatial dependence. That the growth performance of cities or regions close to each 
other should interact is not in itself surprising, so we should expect to find systematic 
spatial patterns in growth. These might be caused by common factors (e.g. some 
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shared structural or institutional features) but we should also expect to find localized 
interactions to be more pervasive and responsive than those between cities or regions 
that are widely separated or – given the findings on population mobility – separated 
by national borders. If, therefore, we can find variables that reflect spatial adjustment 
mechanisms between neighboring regions we should be able to ‘explain’ remaining 
spatial patterns in the data. In other words a finding of spatial dependence is really 
an indicator of an omitted variables problem and if the model(s) can be more fully 
and appropriately specified then any indicated problems of spatial dependence 
should be resolved. In testing for spatial dependence and formulating our variables 
to reflect spatial adjustment processes, we also find that results critically depend on 
how the spatial weights matrix is formulated. Following standard procedures to 
specify the spatial weights matrix, we experiment with contiguity, geographic and 
time-distance and find test statistics which reveal no apparent problems of spatial 
dependence in the theoretically more satisfying models. Problems of spatial 
dependence are only indicated when an additional time-distance penalty for national 
borders is introduced. This is consistent with our other findings, which show, for 
example, that climatic differences only influence population mobility if expressed 
relative to a country’s mean. These findings indicate that national borders in Europe 
present a continuing barrier to processes of spatial adjustment - even for localized 
economic adjustment. 
 
3.  Results 
Common Features of Models of Population and Economic Growth 
Appendix Tables 1a & b define the main variables used. Models for both population 
and GDP per capita growth apply the same basic approach. We first build a ‘base’ 
model and test it for standard specification problems and for spatial dependence. In 
the latter tests we pay particular attention to the specification of the spatial weights 
matrix - choosing weights which maximize the indicated sensitivity to problems of 
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spatial dependence while conforming to obvious economic logic. For both sets of 
models we use OLS. The exception is the estimation of models with a spatial lag 
where we use maximum likelihood. We try to minimize problems of endogeneity. 
Although we recognize that our efforts do not necessarily entirely eliminate all such 
problems, we believe that any remaining endogeneity problems do not significantly 
influence the results.  
There are two families of models in our analysis: 1) those that use the FUR rate of 
change of population from 1980 to 2000 as the dependent variable and 2) those that 
use the FUR rate of growth of GDP per capita at purchasing power standard (PPS) 
measured from the mean of 1978-80 to the mean of 1992-94 as the dependent 
variable. The main control variables in the two families of models are similar. We 
have consistently found that specific measures of reliance on old, resource-based 
industries (e.g., the coal industry, port activity, agriculture) perform better than more 
generalized measures such as employment in industry or unemployment at the start 
of the period (although each of these is included in one model and is marginally 
useful). Since reliance on the coal industry is measured with a geological indicator, it 
seems safe to assume it is exogenous. Port activity is measured very early – 1969 – 
before the main transformation of the industry to modern methods and before any 
likely integration effects of creating the European Union would be apparent. 
Concentration on agriculture is not in the FUR itself but in the larger region 
containing the FUR – again well before the start of the period covered by the 
dependent variable. These control variables reflect economic factors and work in 
very similar ways, whether FUR population or GDP per capita growth is the 
dependent variable. 
One result of using the major FURs as our spatial units of analysis is that a large 
proportion of the territory of each country is outside their area. In 2001, the total 
population of the EU-12, excluding Berlin, was about 340.5 million. At that time, 
almost exactly half – 169.2 million – lived in its major FURs as defined here. This 
property of the FURs allows us to define two additional control variables: the rate of 
natural growth of population in the area of each country that is outside its major 
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FURs and the rate of growth of GDP per capita in the same area. In each case, we 
calculate these control variables over the same period as our dependent variable. By 
including the rate of non-FUR natural population growth as an independent variable 
in the population models, we effectively model quasi-net migration.  
In cross-sectional analyses of regional growth the conventional control for all 
country-specific factors (notably the incidence of the national economic cycles but 
also institutional and policy differences between countries) has been national 
dummies. However, this would be problematic with our data set since Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal each have only one or two major FURs. This means we 
would have to arbitrarily choose which countries to pool to construct national 
dummies. More interestingly, since we wish to infer causation, our underlying 
assumption must be that our observational units – the major FURs of Western 
Europe – are in statistical terms a homogeneous population. A more elegant solution 
to control for national factors not explicitly included as independent variables is, 
therefore, to include ‘non-FUR growth’ as a continuous control variable. 
 
4. Results for Population Growth (1980 to 2000) 
Table 1 shows the ‘Base’ model for FUR population growth. All variables are 
significant and have the expected signs. There are two variables, in addition to those 
discussed above, that reflect expectations about systematic spatial patterns of 
growth. The first of these is taken directly from Clark et al, 1969 (with values 
extended to cover Spain and Portugal, using Keeble et al, 1988). The process of 
European integration, in combination with falling transport costs, was expected to 
lead to systematic changes in regional economic potential, favoring ‘core’ regions. 
Clark et al estimated for each region of the original six member countries, plus 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK, the impact of European integration on 
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‘economic potential.’3 We have added our own estimates for the major FURs of 
Greece. Clark et al’s expectation was that changes in economic potential so measured 
would indicate the regional patterns of systematic gains and losses from the creation 
and enlargement of the EU. Although the original theoretical underpinnings were 
somewhat ad hoc, such a prediction seems entirely compatible with New Economic 
Geography models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 This is measured as the accessibility costs to total GDP at every point, allowing for the costs of 
trade and transport and how those would change with the elimination of tariffs, EU enlargement, 
and transport improvements to include containerisation and roll-on roll-off ferries. 
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Table 1 
Dependent Variable: FUR Population Growth Rate 1980 to 2000 - The Base Model 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6  ‘Base’ 
R-squared 0.2460 0.3101 0.3830 0.4818 0.5014 0.5180 
       
Constant 
0.006886
5 
0.006600
6 
0.008491
5 
0.005555
3 
0.005351
3 0.005074 
T 4.15 4.02 4.77 3.76 3.51 3.31 
Agric Emp.’75 
0.000343
1 
0.000243
2 0.0001806 
0.000381
8 
0.000396
6 
0.000410
2 
T 3.59 2.57 1.93 4.04 4.07 4.21 
(Agric Emp.’75)2 -0.000009 
-
0.000006
5 -0.000005 
-
0.000009
2 
-
0.000009
2 
-
0.000009
4 
T -3.50 -2.47 -2.04 -3.62 -3.52 -3.61 
Ind. Emp.’75 
-
0.000145
6 
-
0.000112
3 -0.000134 
-
0.000156
4 
-
0.000171
6 
-
0.000169
3 
T -3.93 -2.78 -3.25 -3.81 -4.11 -4.07 
Coalfield: core  
-
0.002659
1 
-
0.002909
5 
-
0.002837
1 
-
0.002450
7 
-
0.002114
3 
T  -2.75 -3.31 -3.27 -2.90 -2.43 
Coalfield: hint’land  
-
0.002092
2 
-
0.002318
2 
-
0.002289
2 
-
0.002724
5 
-
0.002054
8 
T  -3.60 -2.88 -3.14 -3.65 -2.48 
Port size ’69   
-
0.001026
7 
-
0.000861
7 
-
0.000821
6 
-
0.000727
8 
T   -3.08 -2.90 -2.98 -2.56 
(Port size ’69)2   
0.000056
9 
0.000047
8 
0.000041
2 
0.000036
6 
T   3.36 3.21 2.91 2.51 
Nat Non-FUR Pop Growth ’80-
’00    
0.473166
1 
0.455977
1 
0.441785
2 
T    4.38 4.15 3.95 
(Integration Gain)2     
0.001100
8 
0.001127
8 
T     2.30 2.48 
Interaction ’79-’91      
0.044080
6 
T      2.11 
 
Parameter estimates shown in italics are significant only at 10%: all other parameter estimates 
are significant at 5% or better 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown in 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the authors’ 
estimates.  
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Localized adjustments 
There are likely to be other systematic spatial patterns between FUR population growth 
rates because of interaction between contiguous FURs. People in Europe may be very 
immobile, but in the specific conditions of dense urbanization there are alternative 
forms of spatial labor market adjustment. In the EU, there are swathes of densely 
urbanized territory where FURs are not just tightly clustered; their boundaries and 
commuting hinterlands touch and, at the ‘commuter shed’, there is still substantial 
cross-border commuting. In such conditions, if the economic attractions of one FUR 
increase relative to its neighbors, that FUR will attract additional commuters. Since 
changes in commuting patterns are cheap – particularly if there are good transport links 
– such adjustments between adjacent FURs should be expected to respond to small 
changes in the spatial distribution of opportunities. 
If changes in commuting patterns act as spatial adjustment mechanisms between 
neighboring FURs, then we would expect there to be a ‘growth shadow effect’. That is, a 
FUR growing economically faster than neighboring FURs will initially attract additional 
workers from those FURs. Over time, a proportion of these long distance commuters 
attracted to work in the faster growing FUR may move there and become short distance 
inter-FUR ‘migrants,’ which would lead to population growth in the subsequent period 
in the economically more dynamic FUR. Moreover, since long distance commuters have 
higher human capital and perhaps favorable unmeasured productivity characteristics, 
there would also be a composition effect. This means the productivity of the labor force 
of the FUR that has attracted additional commuters would grow relative to that of its 
neighbor(s). Finally, there might also be dynamic agglomeration effects favoring 
productivity growth in the faster growing FUR. It was shown in Cheshire et al, 2004, 
that commuting flows between FURs do in fact adjust to differential employment 
opportunities in the way indicated above and that the response of net commuting to 
differential growth in employment opportunities is subject to a quite sharp distance 
decay effect. 
Paul C. Cheshire & Stefano Magrini  
 
                                                                                                                                      
13 
We represent this localized interaction through the medium of labor market 
adjustment using the “Interaction” variable. This is measured as the sum of the 
differences in the employment growth rates in each FUR and in all other FURs 
within 100 minutes traveling time, weighted by the inverse of time-distance over the 
period 1979-1991. It thus proxies for net commuters attracted to employment in each 
FUR over the first half of the period. The estimated parameter for the variable is 
significant and positive, supporting the interpretation that commuters attracted to a 
FUR in one period reinforce the dynamism of the more successful FUR relative to its 
neighbors and generate differential population growth over the period as a whole. 
Although not reported here, it is also worth mentioning that compared to models 
that do not include this “Interaction” variable, problems of spatial dependence are 
much reduced.  
Table 2 
Dependent Variable: FUR Population Growth Rate 1980 to 2000 - Base 
Model plus Geographic and Climate Variables 
 
 Base + geographical variables  Base model + climate  variables 
   Linear Quadratic 
 
West or 
South 
within 
country 
South 
within 
country 
 
West or 
South 
within EU 
  
Wet day 
frequency 
ratio: 
country 
Wet day 
frequency 
ratio: 
country 
Mean 
Temperat
ure ratio: 
country 
Maximum 
Temperatur
e ratio: 
country 
Model 7 8 9  10 11 12 13 
R2 0.6012 0.5951 0.5258  0.5940 0.6090 0.5863 0.5946 
         
West 
-
0.00000
2   
1
ˆβ x  
-
0.00789 
-
0.02615 
-
0.04805
6 
-
0.076058 
T -1.44   t -4.70 -3.98 -2.37 -2.29 
         
South 
0.00000
5 
0.00000
5  2
ˆβ x2  0.00938
7 
0.02607
6 0.041133 
T 4.02 4.69  t  2.91 2.74 2.58 
         
EUwest   
0.00000
08  
    
T   0.99      
         
EUsouth   
0.00000
04  
    
T   0.66      
 
Parameter estimates shown in italics are not significant at 10% 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown in 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the authors’ 
estimates.  
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Better weather attracts 
Table 2 shows what happens if we include geographic and climatic variables in the 
base model. Two conclusions clearly emerge. The first is that FURs further south 
grew faster, but this effect was only within countries. When the position of a FUR is 
measured relative to a fixed point in the EU- 12 (taken arbitrarily as the centroid of 
the FUR of Brussels) then its geographic position is statistically insignificant. 
However, there was still a strong effect of being further south within each country. 
Being further west within a country had a minor but insignificant effect on 
population growth: being further west within the EU as a whole had no significant 
impact on population growth. Numerous studies in the US (e.g., Graves, 1976, 1979, 
1980 & 1983; Rappaport, 2004) have shown that - other things equal - migration is 
sensitive to better weather. Likewise in the ‘Quality of Life’ literature (e.g., Blomquist 
et al, 1988; Gyourko and Tracey, 1991) climate is an important driver of quality of life. 
The data do not allow us to estimate full ‘Quality of Life’ models in Europe. 
However, the results of including measures of weather are shown in the last four 
columns of Table 2. We can see that these weather variables are statistically highly 
significant and, if anything, perform rather better than the geographic position of a 
FUR. The functional form that is most appropriate seems to be quadratic, although 
the relationship is quite close to linear. These results confirm that it is only the 
climate of a FUR relative to the mean for its country that is significant. Again, 
expressing climatic differences relative to the mean for the EU as a whole proves 
entirely insignificant. Table 3 shows the results for some better performing models 
and shows that the best results are achieved if measures of both dryness and warmth 
relative to national means are included.   
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Table 3 
Dependent Variable: FUR Population Growth Rate 1980 to 2000 - Best Models 
Model 14 15 16 
R-squared 0.6325 0.6326 0.6405 
Constant plus:    
Agric Emp.’75 0.0003127 0.0004266 0.0004079 
t 3.02 4.32 4.42 
(Agric Emp.’75)2 -0.0000056 -0.0000083 -0.0000075 
t -2.09 -3.31 -3.06 
Industrial Emp.’75 -0.0000962 -0.0001457 -0.0001213 
t -2.55 -3.71 -3.55 
Coalfield: core -0.0015896 -0.001655 -0.001812 
t -2.21 -2.10 -2.42 
Coalfield: hint’land -0.0020415 -0.001682 -0.0018028 
t -2.47 -2.12 -2.37 
Port size ’69 -0.0005831 -0.0006274 -0.0006521 
t -2.30 -2.59 -2.64 
(Port size ’69)2 0.0000291 0.0000294 0.0000315 
t 2.31 2.39 2.55 
Nat Non-FUR Pop Growth ’80-’00 0.3029144 0.5536141 0.4710524 
t 2.41 4.91 4.38 
(Integration Gain)2 0.0015988 0.0020954 0.0020679 
t 3.41 4.54 4.50 
Interaction ’79-’91 0.0539774 0.0532723 0.0519908 
t 2.69 2.70 2.73 
South within EU 0.0000032   
t 2.80   
Frost frequency ratio : country  -0.0039281  
t  -2.50  
(Frost frequency ratio : country)2  0.0020628  
t  3.36  
Maximum temperature ratio : 
country   -0.0752656 
t   -2.33 
(Maximum temperature ratio : 
country)2   0.0379645 
t   2.51 
Wet day frequency ratio : country -0.0214449 -0.0247 -0.0202854 
t -3.77 -3.76 -3.58 
(Wet day frequency ratio : country)2 0.0082249 0.008621 0.0069708 
t 2.78 2.81 2.37 
 
All parameter estimates significant at 5% or better 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown in 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the authors’ 
estimates.  
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Spatial dependence 
The results of diagnostic tests on these models are reported in Cheshire and Magrini, 
2006. These results suggest that there are no problems of either heteroskedasticity or 
non-normality of errors. The value of the multicollinearity condition number is 
relatively high in most of the models in which climate variables are included in 
quadratic form. However, since the parameter estimates are stable and the functional 
form (effectively suggesting that it is asymptotic to an upper value) seems sensible, 
this does not seem to be a cause for concern. 
As is well known, the major practical issue in testing for problems of spatial 
dependence is the choice of measures of ‘distance’. There is no ‘theoretically correct’ 
measure that one should select a priori. The spatial econometrics literature provides 
examples of many measures: contiguity; linear geographic distance; time-distance; or 
the inverse of time distance. Our view is that any indicators of spatial dependence 
should in principle be reflections of underlying spatial processes. This suggests two 
points: one should select the distance weights in a way that makes sense in terms of 
spatial economics and spatial economic adjustment processes; and a reasonable 
criterion for choosing the weights is that, assuming they make sense in economic terms, 
they maximize sensitivity to spatial dependence. 
With these points in mind, we measured distance between FURs as the transit time by 
road, including any ferry crossings and using the standard commercial software for 
road freight. We tested for both the inverse of time distance and the inverse of time 
distance squared. Given that we had already found that national frontiers constituted 
strong barriers to spatial mobility (from the results on climate and geographical 
variables), we also experimented with an added time distance for all FURs separated by 
a national border. We found that the greatest sensitivity in the tests for spatial depen-
dence was achieved if the time cost of a national border was set at 120 minutes.  
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Table 4  
Inclusion of Spatially Lagged Population Growth 1980 to 2000 
 Model 17  Model 18 Model 19 
    
R-squared 0.5416 0.6418 0.6468 
Loglikelihood 554.986 568.97 569.604 
    
Spatially lagged pop growth 1980-
‘00 0.37939 0.25415 0.21369 
prob 0.0004 0.0196 0.0540 
Agric Emp.’75 0.00033 0.00037 0.00036 
prob 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
(Agric Emp.’75)2 -0.00001 -0.00001 -6.6E-06 
prob 0.0018 0.0027 0.0056 
Industrial Emp.’75 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00011 
prob 0.0001 0.0003 0.0013 
Coalfield: core -0.00169 -0.00141 -0.0016 
prob 0.0214 0.0357 0.0154 
Coalfield: hint’land -0.00177* -0.00150* -0.00165* 
prob 0.0774* 0.0984* 0.0668* 
Port size ’69 -0.00069 -0.00061 -0.00064 
prob 0.0032 0.0050 0.0024 
(Port size ’69)2 0.00003 0.00003 3.04E-05 
prob 0.0236 0.0427 0.0233 
(Integration Gain)2 0.00077 0.00175 0.00178 
prob 0.1146 0.0002 0.0002 
Interaction ’79-’91 0.04829 0.05532 0.05378 
prob 0.0194 0.0029 0.0037 
Nat Non-FUR Pop Growth ’80-’00 0.37956 0.50526 0.43847 
prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wet day frequency ratio : country  -0.02122 -0.01743 
prob  0.0130 0.0391 
(Wet day frequency ratio : country)2  0.00715* 0.00563 
prob  0.0937* 0.1853 
Frost frequency ratio : country  -0.00350  
prob  0.0401  
(Frost frequency ratio : country)2  0.00193  
prob  0.0097  
Max. Temperature : country   -0.07122 
prob   0.0060 
(Max. Temperature : country)2   0.03555 
prob   0.0042 
 
* Estimated parameters significant at 10%.    All other estimates significant at 5% or better except 
those in italics which are not significant at 10%. 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown in 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the authors’ 
estimates.  
Spatial dependence seems likely to be only a minor problem, however. It only shows 
up as significant at all when distance is represented in the most sensitive form - as 
the inverse of time distance squared and including the 120 minute national border 
Urban Growth Drivers and Spatial Inequalities 
 
 
 
18 
effect. Indeed, if no time-distance penalty for national borders is included, then, in 
the better models, no problems of spatial dependence were indicated. Even then, in 
Model 16 (in Table 3), indicated spatial dependence was only on the margins of 
significance at 10%. Nevertheless, it seemed safer to re-estimate including a spatial 
lag of the dependent variable. Selected (and representative) results of this re-
estimation are reported in Table 4. The spatially lagged value of population growth is 
significant. All signs remain appropriate and – except for the spatial effects of EU 
integration in the ‘base’ model - all variables are significant at least at 10%. A few 
variables, however, cease to be significant at 5%, although the diagnostics remain 
reassuring. Perhaps most reassuring of all, and again consistent with the conclusion 
that problems of spatial dependence are for practical purposes very minor, the 
coefficient estimates for equivalent models are numerically very similar in the 
spatially lagged estimates (Table 4) and the robust standard error OLS estimates 
reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
 
5. Analysis and Results for GDP Growth per Capita (1978 
to 1994) 
Many of the drivers of economic growth differ 
The analysis of FUR per capita GDP growth draws on Cheshire and Magrini (2009). 
Although we use similar controls to those in the models of population growth, we 
learn from that process by dividing our variables more strictly between those 
designed to reflect specific drivers - such as inheritance of old, resource-based 
industries - and those designed to reflect systematic spatial patterns and adjustment 
processes. We are particularly interested in investigating the role of concentrations of 
highly skilled human capital and the localized impact of concentrations of R&D. 
However, we are also interested in seeing whether the evidence is consistent with 
dynamic agglomeration economies and what the impact of density may be, 
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independent of agglomeration. Finally, we are interested in testing hypotheses about 
the impact of governmental arrangements on urban economic growth. 
In our models analyzing population growth, our main interest was on the impact of 
climate and the extent to which there appeared to be a single unified European urban 
system. For completeness, however, all the variables relating to human capital 
concentrations, R&D, and urban government were included in the population 
models. None proved to be significant. In a complementary way, for completeness, 
we included climate variables in the economic growth models, but, again, none was 
significant (although having a wetter climate relative to the national mean came 
quite close to being significantly and positively related to economic growth). The 
evidence is strong that many of the most significant drivers of economic growth are 
entirely different from those of population growth. However, there are also some 
similarities: both processes reveal the continued importance of national boundaries 
in Europe and that they are significant barriers to spatial adjustment other than 
across wider densely urbanized regions. There are also some controls that are 
common to both processes. 
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Table 5 
Dependent Variable Annualized Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 
to mean 1992/4 - Base Model OLS: Base Model + Spatial lag – Max. Lik. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
R2 0.5903 0.6053 
Adjusted R2 0.5570  
LIK 485.56 488.74 
   
Constant -0.0205 -0.0240 
t-test  -  prob -2.05 0.04 -2.55 0.01 
Spatial Lag of dep. variable  0.2648 
t-test  -  prob   2.61 0.01 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.8600 0.7119 
t-test  -  prob 8.06 0.00 6.24 0.00 
Coalfield: core -0.0054 -0.0050 
t-test  -  prob -4.25 0.00 -4.13 0.00 
Coalfield: hinterland -0.0057 -0.0054 
t-test  -  prob -3.29 0.00 -3.37 0.00 
Port Size -0.1364 -0.1416 
t-test  -  prob -3.18 0.00 -3.56 0.00 
Port Size squared 0.6166 0.6550 
t-test  -  prob 2.28 0.02 2.61 0.01 
Agriculture 0.0409 0.0254 
t-test  -  prob 2.55 0.01 1.67 0.10 
Agriculture squared -0.1125 -0.0737 
t-test  -  prob -2.51 0.01 -1.75 0.08 
Population Size 0.0021 0.0019 
t-test  -  prob 3.16 0.00 3.11 0.00 
Population Density -0.0015 -0.0015 
t-test  -  prob -2.00 0.05 -2.19 0.03 
 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown in 
Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the authors’ 
estimates. 
 
Controlling for ‘national’ factors 
The rate of growth of GDP per capita outside the major FURs (Non-FUR Growth) 
proves significant and, as the models become more fully specified, the value of the 
estimated co-efficient tends to get closer to 1. This can be seen by comparing the 
results in Tables 5 and 6. The results of estimating the ‘Base’ model are shown in 
Table 5. All variables are significant and have the expected signs, although adding a 
spatial lag of the dependent variable reduces the significance of the concentration in 
agriculture in the wider region in 1975.   
 
Paul C. Cheshire & Stefano Magrini  
 
                                                                                                                                      
21 
Growth: agglomeration good; density bad 
There are indications of dynamic agglomeration economies – larger FURs grew faster 
when other factors were controlled for. However, once FUR size was controlled for, 
those FURs that were denser grew more slowly. The rationale for including both 
FUR size and initial population density is that the factors generating agglomeration 
economies are distinct from density itself. Agglomeration economies arise as a result 
of the number and net value of productive interactions between economic agents, 
and these are larger in larger cities. Population density also rises with city size and in 
studies of agglomeration economies, density of employment or population has often 
been used as the ‘explanatory’ variable. While this approach is not inappropriate in 
unregulated conditions, in a number of EU countries where there are very strong 
urban containment policies, population density and population size will to some 
extent vary independently of each other. Once size has been controlled for, higher 
density should be associated with both higher space costs (see Cheshire and Hilber, 
2008) and more congestion, and is thus expected to be associated with less favorable 
conditions for economic activity. The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are entirely 
consistent with this reasoning. 
 
Spatial dependence – introducing a spatial lag 
Although we do not report the test statistics in Tables 5 and 6, those for the standard 
problems of heteroskedasticity, non-normality of errors, multicollinearity and 
functional form were all within acceptable ranges (see Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). 
So, too, were tests for spatial dependence, except for the case where an additional 
time-distance penalty for national borders was included. Further experimentation 
showed that spatial dependence problems were maximized if this national border 
penalty was set at 600 minutes. The indicated textbook solution was to include the 
spatially lagged dependent variable as an additional independent variable. The 
results of doing so are shown for model 2 reported in the final column of Table 5. The 
spatially lagged dependent variable is significant but has little effect on the other 
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estimated parameters except for reducing the significance of past specialization in 
agriculture in the wider region. 
As noted above, our preferred approach to problems of spatial dependence is to treat 
a significant result as indicating a problem of omitted variables: in the present case, 
those driving systematic spatial patterns of FUR growth. Table 6 shows the results of 
including such variables, plus additional variables designed to test specific 
hypotheses.  
 
Human capital, R&D and local growth promotion with spatial spillovers 
The idea that concentrations of highly skilled human capital should be associated 
with faster rates of real GDP per capita growth (itself very closely related to 
productivity growth) is not new. It is represented here as the ratio of university 
students to total employees at the very start of the period (to help reduce any 
possible problems of endogeneity which would certainly be a danger if, for example, 
the variable was defined as university graduates in the labor force at the end of the 
period). There is a large literature on the tendency for patents to be applied closer to 
their points of origin (see e.g., Audretsch, 1998, or, for a recent application to a 
European context, Barrios et al., 2008). So we would expect FURs with greater 
concentrations of R&D activity at the start of the period to have grown faster. This is 
measured as R&D facilities of the largest firms per 1000 inhabitants – again at the 
start of the period. 
The third variable designed to test hypotheses about the drivers of economic growth 
is rather more novel. Tiebout (1956) is one of the most cited papers in local public 
finance. It shows that, under certain conditions, if there are many competing local 
jurisdictions, then the provision of local public goods will match the structure of 
demand as people vote with their feet to find the best combination of tax rates and 
public goods available to them. The ‘certain conditions’ assumed to prevail are that 
people are perfectly mobile and that there are no spillovers of public goods from one 
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jurisdiction to another. It is easy, however, to think of local public goods, such as 
crime reduction or pollution control, which are likely to involve jurisdictional 
spillovers. Moreover, as already noted here, people in Europe are far from perfectly 
mobile. 
Therefore we consider an ‘anti-Tiebout’ world in which the provision of a local 
public good may involve jurisdictional spillovers and where mobility is expensive. In 
this case, the implications are that a more efficient provision of local public goods 
may result if jurisdictional boundaries coincide with the set of households/agents 
affected by the local public good(s). One of the notable recent trends in Europe is the 
spread of local growth promotion efforts by authorities or agencies representing 
cities and regions. Now, if we suspend our disbelief and allow for the possibility that 
such policies4 may have some positive impact, then local growth promotion policies 
would consist of the provision of a pure local public good. Extra local growth would 
have zero opportunity costs in consumption and be non-excludable. If, my rents go 
up because of additional local growth, that imposes no cost on other owners of real 
estate. Moreover, if a local growth promotion agency is successful, it will not be 
possible to exclude residents from outside the jurisdiction from benefiting from the 
better job opportunities or higher wages. 
Since FURs are intentionally defined to be economically self-contained, their boundaries 
should minimize spillovers of local growth. Those who benefit from any jobs or 
incomes created within a FUR live within its boundaries (although there may be 
external owners of assets). So the more closely a local jurisdiction’s boundaries 
correspond to the extent of a FUR, the smaller - other things equal - will be the spillover 
losses from successful growth promotion efforts. The other factor determining the 
                                                        
4 We are not here concerned with the particular form such policies may take. Clearly much of the 
effort of local growth promotion agencies goes into trying to attract mobile investment. This is 
not necessarily a policy with much payoff. More effective policies may include simple efficiency in 
public administration, transparent regulation, flexible land use policies with quick and cheap 
decisions, and effective co-ordination of public infrastructure provision with private investment. 
None of these policies will necessarily be measured in higher local expenditures - so total 
spending – even if data were available - by either local government or local development 
agencies will not too effectively capture the efficiency of local growth promotions efforts. 
Moreover since the functions of local government compared to national and, where it exists, 
regional government, vary so much across Europe, it is impractical to use local spending as an 
indicator of local growth promotion efforts. 
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incentive to establish local growth promotion agencies will be the transaction costs 
incurred. Such agencies typically consist of public-private partnerships initiated and 
facilitated by local government. The fewer the total number of jurisdictions and the 
larger is the central local jurisdiction, the lower will be the transaction costs, and so the 
greater will be the net payoff from establishing a growth promotion agency.  
Arguments such as these prompted Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to 
hypothesize  that growth promotion policies would be more likely to appear and be 
more energetically pursued where ‘there are a smaller number of public agencies 
representing the functional economic region, with the boundaries of the highest tier 
authority approximating to those of the region…’. 
A variable that captures this idea is simply a measure of how closely each FUR’s 
boundaries match those of the central jurisdiction, defined as the ratio of jurisdiction to 
FUR population at the start of the period. The hypothesis is that the more closely these 
match, the greater will be the payoff to forming an effective growth promotion agency, 
other things being equal. It could be that the advantage increases as the governmental 
unit becomes bigger than the FUR itself (as happens in some European countries in 
which there is an effective regional tier of government – Madrid might be an example) 
because the resources and clout of the governmental unit will be greater. But if the 
governmental unit is too large, the interests of the main FUR within it may get diluted 
by those of outlying smaller cities and rural areas. Assuming that growth promotion 
agencies are able to have any impact on local economic growth, this implies a positive 
(perhaps quadratic) relationship between the variable we call the ‘policy incentive’ and 
GDP per capita growth, since a regional tier of government that too greatly exceeds the 
size of the economic region or FUR may dilute the positive impact on growth.  
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Table 6 
Dependent Variable Annualized Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 
to mean 1992/4 – Models excluding and including ‘Spatial Variables’ 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
R2 0.6765 0.7413 0.7555 
Adjusted R2 0.6372 0.6986 0.7095 
LIK 499.86 513.38 516.80 
    
Constant -0.0320 -0.0233 -0.0261 
t-test  -  prob -3.14 0.00 -3.52    0.01 -2.84 0.01 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.9442 0.8975 0.9050 
t-test  -  prob 9.22    0.00 9.07    0.00 9.31 0.00 
Coalfield: core -0.0062 -0.0051 -0.0051 
t-test  -  prob -5.18    0.00 -3.99    0.00 -4.00 0.00 
Coalfield: hinterland -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0032 
t-test  -  prob -2.61    0.01 -2.23    0.03 -2.06 0.04 
Port Size -0.1474 -0.1003 -0.0932 
t-test  -  prob -3.69    0.00 -2.62    0.01 -2.46 0.02 
Port Size squared 0.7634 0.4871 0.4669 
t-test  -  prob 3.04    0.00 2.02    0.05 1.97 0.05 
Agriculture 0.0508 0.0384 0.0478 
t-test  -  prob 3.22    0.00 2.48     0.01 3.02 0.00 
Agriculture squared -0.1345 -0.1126 -0.1231 
t-test  -  prob -3.21    0.00 -2.82    0.01 -3.12 0.00 
Unemployment  -0.0332 -0.0312 
t-test  -  prob  -2.45    0.02 -2.29 0.02 
Population Size 0.0021 0.0016 0.0016 
t-test  -  prob 3.53    0.00 2.90    0.00 2.87 0.01 
Population Density -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0013 
t-test  -  prob -2.25    0.03 -2.36    0.02 -2.07 0.04 
Integration Gain  0.0073 0.0082 
t-test  -  prob  3.20    0.00 3.61 0.00 
University Students 0.0309 0.0367 0.0303 
t-test  -  prob 2.67    0.01 3.62    0.00 2.87 0.01 
R&D Facilities 0.8079 0.8947 0.8512 
t-test  -  prob 2.84    0.01 3.26    0.00 3.10 0.00 
Policy Incentive 0.0075 0.0026 0.0086 a 
t-test  -  prob 2.24    0.03 2.45    0.02 2.49 0.01 
Policy Incentive squared -0.0021  -0.0027 a 
t-test  -  prob -1.32    0.19  -1.72 0.09 
R&D Facilities Density  0.0531 0.0703 
t-test  -  prob  2.19    0.03 2.70 0.01 
Peripherality Dummy  0.0059 0.0054 
t-test  -  prob  4.51    0.00 4.10 0.00 
University Student Density  -0.0025 -0.0030 
t-test  -  prob  -2.46    0.02 -2.93 0.00 
Unemployment Density   -0.0036 
t-test  -  prob   -1.92 0.06 
 
Note: a  Test of joint significance: χ2(2) = 10.4333 (0.01). 
Variables are defined in Appendix Tables 1a and 1b. Sources for all variables are shown 
in Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. Parameter values in the above table are the 
authors’ estimates. 
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Model 3 in Table 6 includes all these variables. Including these variables, which are all 
significant, improves the fit of the model without significantly changing the estimated 
parameter values of the existing variables. Only the functional form of the policy 
incentive variable is unclear, since the quadratic term, although it has the expected sign, 
is not significant. Testing for spatial dependence (see Cheshire and Magrini, 2009 for 
details), however, reveals apparent problems if the 600 minute time-distance penalty is 
included for national borders. This suggests that variables reflecting systematic spatial 
patterns are omitted. 
 
Systematic spatial influences on growth 
Models 4 and 5 in Table 6 show the impact of including variables designed to capture 
such spatial influences. The first two relate to Europe-wide influences on spatial 
patterns of urban growth. The first is the “Integration Gain” variable, which is intended 
to capture the spatial effect of European integration. Partly as a response to the 
perceived advantage accruing to ‘core’ regions from European integration, starting in 
the mid-1970s, Europe developed stronger policies aimed at redistributing economic 
activity to ‘peripheral’ regions. In 1972, such policies accounted for 4 percent of 
spending by the European Commission but increased to 15 percent by 1980 and about 
30 percent by 1994. Although its impact has been questioned (see, Midelfart and 
Overman, 2002; Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004), a variable for ‘peripherality’ still 
seems worth including. To avoid any apparent subjectivity in selecting ‘peripheral’ 
regions, this variable is arbitrarily defined as being all FURs more than 600 minutes 
time-distance from Brussels. 
It is also plausible that in the more densely urbanized parts of Europe conditions in 
FURs will influence each other. That is, there will be interaction between neighboring 
cities. Drawing on the literature on spatial labor markets and the distance decay effect 
of innovations, we include three variables to try to capture these interactions. There is 
evidence, particularly from the spatial applications of patents, that new innovations are 
subject to a distance decay effect, and we have already seen that concentrations of R&D 
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favor FUR growth. Thus, if there are concentrations of R&D in a FUR, one would expect 
it to favor growth in FURs close by, subject to a distance decay effect. This is reflected in 
the design of the “R&D Facilities Density” variable. Similarly, if a concentration of 
highly skilled labor favors a FUR’s growth, then a higher concentration in neighboring 
FURs would be expected to reduce the FUR’s growth since the faster growth generated 
in the surrounding FURs will tend to attract highly skilled commuters away from the 
slower growing FUR. This is reflected in the “University Student Density” variable.  
Finally, some studies (e.g., Glaeser et al, 1995) suggest that a higher initial level of 
unemployment inhibits subsequent growth. Therefore, models 4 and 5 include both the 
initial level of unemployment in FURi and an “Unemployment Density” variable, 
calculated as the distance-weighted level of unemployment in all neighboring FURsj-n 
with up to 120 minutes between centroids. The time distance cut-off applied to the R&D 
Facilities and University Students Density variables is higher – 150 minutes. These 
differential cut-offs provide better statistical performance, but are also consistent with 
underlying reasoning. The unemployed, who are biased towards the least skilled, are 
likely to have a geographically more confined influence than either the most highly 
skilled workers or innovation. For each FUR, the 600 minute time-distance penalty for 
national borders is applied to calculate the value of these spatial interaction variables 
implying that the processes of adjustment between the economies of neighboring FURs 
are severely impeded if a national border separates them. This is consistent with the 
logic underlying our choice for the spatial weights matrix but it also fits the data better. 
That is according to the test statistics a finding of spatial dependence becomes even 
more improbable if the 600 minute time distance penalty is included in the calculation 
of these localized spatial adjustment variables. This version of the model not only 
performs better statistically but is consistent with our other findings (see Table 6). 
As shown in Table 6, all variables have the expected sign and are significant at at least 
the 10 percent level. Tests for joint significance provide further evidence that the 
underlying functional form of the policy incentive variable is quadratic, with the 
maximum favorable impact of the relationship between FURs and their administrative 
boundaries appearing when the administrative jurisdiction containing the FUR is about 
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1.5 times its size. Even more encouraging is the fact that all signs of spatial dependence 
are eliminated (see Cheshire and Magrini, 2009, for details). As before, no conventional 
econometric problems are indicated.  
In the context of understanding the main drivers of the rate of FUR GDP per capita 
growth, these results suggest the existence of dynamic agglomeration economies, but 
that other things equal, higher population density is bad for growth. The results also 
suggest that while the process of European integration does indeed favor ‘core’ regions, 
policies to reduce ‘spatial disparities’ (the official aim of European regional policies) 
may have at least partially offset this tendency. The results are certainly consistent with 
the hypothesis that concentrations of highly skilled human capital and R&D favor local 
growth. Perhaps more surprisingly, they suggest that local growth promotion policies 
may have some positive impact because we find significant evidence that the incentives 
regional actors face in developing such policies are themselves influential in explaining 
urban growth performance. It helps if local jurisdictional boundaries coincide more 
closely with those of self-contained economic regions – FURs – because when there are 
spillovers and transactions costs associated with forming effective growth promotion 
agencies, such a coincidence of boundaries increases the expected gains to actors. 
Finally, we find strong evidence that national boundaries are still a barrier to the 
processes of spatial adjustment in Europe. 
 
6. Comparing and Contrasting the Drivers of Population 
and Economic Growth 
Given the reluctance of Europeans to migrate in response to changing patterns of 
opportunity or follow the sun beyond their national boundaries, it does not seem 
appropriate to assume that Europe is characterized by full spatial equilibrium. This has 
implications both for the persistence of spatial disparities in welfare and for the 
processes driving spatial differences in population and economic growth. Controlling 
for differences in the natural rate of population growth, we find some economic drivers 
of population growth - such as an inheritance of an old, resource-based local economy 
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or the systematic impacts of European integration. But these Europe-wide drivers are 
quite weak and only the impact of European integration can really be classed as 
‘Europe-wide’. When we analyze the impact of climate on population growth, we find 
compelling evidence of a purely national impact. It is not differences in climate relative 
to some European mean that is significant: it is only relative to national conditions that 
climate drives FUR population growth. Moreover, in analyzing the sources of spatial 
dependence, we find strong evidence that while population growth in one FUR 
influences its neighbor(s), if a national border separates two FURs, that influence is 
much diminished. 
When we examine the drivers of economic growth, we also find a powerful national 
border barrier to spatial interaction between neighboring FURs. But in other ways, the 
drivers of economic growth are significantly different from the drivers of population 
growth. Dynamic agglomeration economies and concentrations of R&D and highly 
skilled labor are significant in driving GDP per capita growth but not in driving 
population growth. Moreover, the ‘policy incentive’ variable designed to reflect the 
incentives faced by local actors to promote local growth is highly significant in 
accounting for differences in economic growth rates between FURs but not at all 
significant in accounting for differences in population growth.  
It has been asserted that climate and environmental factors have become more 
important in influencing firm location because of their supposed influence on the 
locational choices of highly skilled labor (the so-called ‘new location factors’5). 
However, our findings provide no support for this view. Climatic differences – the most 
obvious environmental factor – are not statistically significant in models of GDP per 
capita growth; the closest they come, indeed, runs counter to the supposed role of the 
alleged ‘new location factors’. When we include the number of wet days relative to the 
national mean in the model, the variable has a positive sign and is on the verge of being 
significant, suggesting  that for economic growth, wetter is better. 
Overall, both the differences and similarities between the drivers of population growth 
                                                        
5 See for example http://geographyfieldwork.com/HighTechLocationFactors.htm  
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and economic growth broadly reflect theory. In a world of “sticky” people, we would 
expect sluggish adjustment to spatial differences in opportunity. We would also expect 
national boundaries to represent additional obstacles to spatial adjustment. Both 
expectations are supported by this analysis. We might also expect there to be a 
systematic adjustment process between FURs in densely populated regions and FURs 
in wider urbanized regions. The literature on labor market search and on induced 
commuting tells us that these processes tend to even out spatial opportunities as they 
occur in sets of labor markets linked by significant (potential) commuting flows. 
Although FUR boundaries are designed to delimit self-contained labor markets, where 
the boundaries are contiguous, people living in the suburban hinterlands can alter their 
commuting patterns over time to take advantage of opportunities in neighboring FURs. 
As a result of vacancy chains - that is the fact that if a person leaves a job in one location 
to fill a vacancy somewhere else they create a vacant job to be filled by someone living 
elsewhere - opportunities will tend to be equalized over the set of linked local labor 
markets (Morrison, 2005). The condition for this opportunity equalization between 
neighboring areas appears to be simply that cross-boundary commuting flows exceed 
some threshold (see Gordon and Lamont, 1982). Thus, without conventional geographic 
mobility, spatial equilibrium may be produced through local labor market interactions 
when geography and transport systems facilitate adjustment in commuting patterns. If 
we include variables designed to reflect this process (and other spatial interactions), 
spatial dependence problems are eliminated but we also find strong evidence that 
adjustment is greatly impeded across European borders. This is true for both 
population growth and economic growth, reinforcing the conclusion that spatial 
differences in Europe are persistent, not just because people are geographically 
immobile but because, if national borders intervene, people tend not to take advantage 
of even those opportunities they could reach without re-locating. 
Apart from increasing our understanding of the drivers of spatial growth and 
adjustment processes, the evidence presented in this paper has a number of wider 
implications. It suggests that differences in real incomes in Europe – and more 
generally where populations are relatively immobile – are likely troublesomely to 
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persist and that they are likely to indicate real differences in welfare, certainly if 
prices do not fully adjust. Although the evidence does not indicate how significant 
inter-regional income differences are relative to other sources of welfare difference 
between individuals, it does imply that people of similar personal characteristics 
may have different life chances simply because they are born in one region rather 
than another. Contrary to some recent assertions (e.g., Kresl, 2007), our findings also 
suggest that there is no evidence of a unified European urban system, but rather of a 
set of national systems, with weak responses to variations in local economic 
opportunities when national boundaries intervene. We also find that there are 
significant, but theoretically consistent, differences in the drivers of population 
compared to economic growth. Agglomeration economies, concentrations of research 
and development (R&D) activity and highly skilled human capital, and systems of 
urban governance play a significant role in driving spatial economic growth 
differences, but no role when it comes to population growth. And, in contrast, while 
there is strong evidence of environmental factors driving population growth, they do 
not seem to influence economic growth differences. Finally, we might speculate that 
the findings for Western Europe may be more applicable than those for the U.S. to 
conditions in Asia, with its long history of settlement, its patchwork of languages 
and cultures, and, particularly to China, where, in addition, there are deliberate 
restrictions on population mobility. 
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Appendix 
Table 1a  
Variable Definitions - Rate of FUR Population Growth 1980 to 2000 = 
Dependent Variable 
 
Industrial Emp.’75 
Percentage of labor force in industry in surrounding level 2 region in 1975: source 
Eurostat 
Coalfield: core  A dummy=1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
Coalfield: 
hinterland 
A dummy=1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
Port size ’69* Volume of port trade in 1969 in tons 
Agric Emp.’75* Percentage of labor force in agriculture in surrounding Level 2 region in 1975 
Integration Gain* 
Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-Treaty of Rome EEC to 
post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs (estimated from Clark et al 
1969 and Keeble et al 1988) 
Interaction ’79-91 
The sum of the differences in the growth rates of employment each FUR and in all 
other FURs within 100 minutes traveling time weighted by distance over the 
period 1979-1991. 
West 
Distance west of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam taken as 
capital of Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
South 
Distance south of centre of FUR from national capital city (Amsterdam taken as 
capital of Netherlands; Bonn of Germany) 
EUwest Distance west of centre of FUR from Brussels 
EUsouth Distance south of centre of FUR from Brussels 
Nat Non-FUR Pop 
Growth ’80-’00 
Annualized rate of growth of population in territory of country outside major 
FURs between 1980 and 2000 
Wet day 
frequency ratio : 
country* 
Ratio of wet day frequency between FUR and national average (1970s and 1980s) 
Frost frequency 
ratio : country* 
Ratio of ground frost frequency between FUR and national average (1970s and 
1980s) 
Maximum 
temperature ratio 
: country* 
maximum temperature percentage difference between FUR and national average 
(1970s and 1980s) 
Cloud cover ratio: 
country* 
Ratio of cloud cover days between FUR and national averages (1970s and 1980s) 
Minimum 
temperature ratio: 
country* 
Ratio of minimum temperatures between FUR and national average (1970s and 
1980s) 
Mean 
temperature ratio: 
country* 
Ratio of mean temperature between FUR and national average (1970s and 1980s) 
Max temperature 
ratio: country* 
Ratio of maximum temperature between FUR and national average (1970s and 
1980s) 
 
Note: * denote variables tried with a quadratic specification for reasons explained in the text: 
never entered as squared value alone.  
All climate variables were also expressed as the ratio of the FUR value to the EU mean. 
Sources for all variables are shown in Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. 
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Table 1b 
Variable Definitions – Rate of Growth of GDP per capita at PPS 1978/80 to 
1992/94 = Dependent Variable 
 
Note: * denote variables tried with a quadratic specification for reasons explained in the text. 
Never entered as squared value alone.  
Sources for all variables are shown in Cheshire and Magrini, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
 
No Variable Name Description 
 Constant  
1 Population Size Population size in 1979 (natural logarithm) 
2 Population Density 
Density of population in FUR in 1979 (1000 
inhabitants/Km2) 
3 Coalfield Dummy: core Dummy = 1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
4 Coalfield Dummy: hinterland 
Dummy = 1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a 
coalfield 
5 Port size * Volume of port trade in 1969 (100 tons) 
6 Agriculture * 
Share of labor force in agriculture in surrounding NUTS 2 in 
1975 
7 Unemployment * 
Unemployment rate (average rate between 1977 and 1981 – 
from Eurostat NUTS3 data) 
8 National Non-FUR Growth 
Growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each country outside 
the FURs (annualized rate between 1978/80 and 1992/94) 
9 Policy Incentive * 
Ratio of the population of the largest governmental unit 
associated with the FUR to that of the FUR in 1981 (see 
below for details) 
10 Integration Gain 
Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-
Treaty of Rome EEC to post enlargement EU with reduced 
transport costs (estimated from Clark et al 1969 and Keeble 
et al 1988) 
11 Peripherality Dummy 
Dummy = 1 if the FUR is more than 10 hours away from 
Brussels 
12 University Students * 
Ratio of university students (1977-78) to total employment 
(1979) 
13 R&D Facilities * 
R&D laboratories of Fortune 500 companies per 1000 
inhabitants in 1980 
14 Unemployment Density  
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average 
between 1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in 
neighboring FURs (within 2 hours), discounted by distance 
(with 10 hours time penalty for national borders) 
15 University Student Density 
Sum of university students per employees in neighboring 
FURs (within 2.5 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 
hours time penalty for national borders) 
16 R&D Facilities Density 
Sum of R&D laboratories per 1000 inhabitants in 
neighboring FURs (within 2.5 hours), discounted by distance 
(with 10 hours time penalty for national borders) 
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